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1. Introduction
FROM THE END OF the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the economic structure of Western Europe underwent a pro-
found change. Cross national income grew at an accelerated rate,
and the center of gravity of the economy shifted from primary to
secondary and later to tertiary industries. The Industrial Revolution
reached its peak in the first quarter of the nineteenth century in
England and in the third quarter in France. After that, rates of
growth declined in both countries, but the trend proceeded along
paths whose basic contours had been traced in the decades preceding
the turning point. In order to understand fully the role of entre-
preneurship in Britain and France, and its relationship to capital
formation and economic development, its place and function must
be examined in the period when modern industrialism was ushered
into these two countries.1
Unfortunately, we lack reliable data which describe precisely
the magnitude of growth rates and concomitant changes in the eco-
nomic structure of the two countries during the period in which
modern industrialism was born We are fortunate, however, that
there were several acute observers who had a predilection for "po-
litical arithmetic" and who have left us computations of national
1Althoughthe approach in this paper is "genetic" in the sense that emphasis
will be placed upon tracing the evolution of entrepreneurship and its relation
to capital formation over time, I shall not discuss the wider problem of the
"origin" of capitalism, or its earlier roots in late medieval and early modern
economies. Also, I am aware that some writers, among them notably John U.
Nef (e.g. "The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered," Journal of Economic
History, May 1943, pp. 1-31), have stressed the development of industry in
Britain and France in the period preceding the middle of the seventeenth
century. The facts cited by this group of scholars are, of course, not disputed.
But as I shall try to show, in spite of the presence of quite sizable industrial
and commercial enterprises in this period, the economic center of gravity was
still very firmly in agriculture and the techniques and organization of agri-
cultural production underwent far-reaching changes only after the middle of
the eighteenth century.
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income and wealth at different crucial periods in the growth process.
Recognizing the many shortcomings of even the best and most re-
liable of these estimates, we may, nevertheless, use them as bench
marks which indicate (within tolerable limits) the order of magni-
tude of over-all output and the shifting composition of national
gross product.
For Britain a very useful series marking the historical trend of
national income and its composition has been published by Cohn
Clark. His figures for France, especially for the earlier years, are
derived from less trustworthy estimates and he has subjected them to
less rigorous analysis. However, some fairly reliable recomputations
of French national income in the period from the end of the ancien
régimeto the end of the Napoleonic period have been published by
A. Chabert, and these data, together with figures derived from
Simiand's Le Salaire, and Clark's data for the more recent years also
yield a useful and tolerably accurate series ranging over a long
period of time.2 On the basis of these sources Table 1 has been con-
structed to provide a general survey of the long-run growth of
British and French national income and to indicate the gradual
shift of the economic center of gravity from primary to secondary
and tertiary industries. This shift may be measured either by the
share of the national product due to primary as against nonprimary
production, or by the distribution of the labor force among different
branches of economic activity.
The most striking difference in the growth patterns of the two
countries is in the over-all rate and the timing. In Britain the level
of income began to grow noticeably during the eighteenth century
and made rapid strides forward during the early nineteenth cen-
tury. In France it remained fairly level from the end of the ancien
régime to the end of the Napoleonic period, then advanced slowly
during the next thirty years until it entered a period of more rapid
growth in the second half of the nineteenth century.8
2 For specific references see the Sources to Table 1.
This point is confirmed also by a new "preliminary" analysis of the his-
torical development of French national income by members of the Institut de
Science Economique Appliquée, "La croissance économique francaise,"in
Income and Wealth, Series Ill, Milton Gilbert, editor, Cambridge, Eng., Bowes
& Bowes for International Association for Research in Income and Wealth,
1953, pp. 45-100. According to this analysis the annual growth rate of French
national income in the period from 1780 to 1914 was 1.81 per cent, but the
estimates of Dutens and Dupin for the period before 1840 yield rates between
1.20 and 1.61 per cent, whereas those of Simiand, Froment, and Pupin for
the second half of the century show rates between 1.56 and 2.01 per cent.
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TABLE1
National Income and Its Distribution in France and Britain, Selected Years
(for Great Britain all absolute figures are in millions of pounds; for France in billions of francs)
. PROPORTION
OF INCOME PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION














1688 50.8 56.4 48 (41) 90
1770 127.8 126.5 (46) 101
1797/1800 217.5 171.8 (46) 128.9
1812 290.0 177.2 37 46 163.7
1847 370.0 381.2 21.9 47.9 30.2 96.8
1868 753.0 767.7 20 14.8 48.8 36.4 98.1
1883 1,120.0 958.0 12.8 49.8 37.4 117.5




1810 6.27 8.47 74
1820 . 7.88 9.83 84.9 63 80
1850 9.7 11.85 43 38 19 85.5
1880 22.7 20.64 . 110.0
1910 33.5 32.21 33.0 46.6 20.3 104
1930 243.0 30.42 24.5 40.0 35.4 711
Figures for Great Britain for 1688 and 1770 are for England and Wales
other years include Scotland.
Figures for France in columns 1 and 2 pertain to national income less indirect taxes.
Figures in columns 4, 5, and 6 do not refer in all cases to the year listed but sometimes to
the year closest to it.
Source: All data are taken from Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed.,
London, Macmillan, 1951, except as indicated below:
For Great Britain: Data in parentheses in column 3 were computed by the writer. Clark's
estimate of the proportion of national income earned in primary industry in 1688 seems too
high, and recomputation of Gregory King's data yields the lower figure in parentheses. All
data for 1770 were computed from the following three works of Arthur Young: A Six Months
Tour through the North of England, London, Strahan, 1770, Vol. Iv; The Farmer's Tour through
the East of 'England, London, Strahan, 1771, Vol. Iv; and Political Arithmetic, Part II, London,
Cadell, 1779. The figures in columns 2 and 7 for 1770-1847 were recomputed according to the
data in Arthur D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, The Growth and Fluc-
tuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953, Vol. x, pp. 468-470.
For France: The data in columns 1 and 3 were obtained chiefly from Alexandre Chabert,
Essai sur le mouvement des reoenus et de l'actioité économique en France de 1789 a 1820,
Paris, Librairie de Médicis, 1949, and Francois Simiand, La Salaire, Paris, F. Alcan, 1932, Vol.
m. Some alterations were made in index numbers for the early part of the nineteenth century
on the basis of the discussion by Chabert.
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These differential rates of growth are also correlated with the
movement among industrial branches. In Britain, agriculture was
the predominant form of economic activity until the late eighteenth
century. After 1800 its relative importance declined and by the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century only about a fifth of the total national
product was due to primary production. In France a similar process
occurred, but the shift from primary production to manufacturing
and service industries occurred oniy during the reign of Louis
Philippe and proceeded from then on at an accelerated rate. While
Britain's secondary and tertiary industries made up a large part of
the national product by the middle of the nineteenth century, France
attained a similar position only shortly before the outbreak of World
War I.
Compared with Britain, France exhibits a pattern of retarded eco-
nomic growth and industrialization. Yet in the history of the two
countries there was a time when there were few apparent differences
in the over-all productivity of the various factors, and when tech-
nological procedures and general economic organization appear to
have been on a fairly even level. In fact, in the sixteenth century,
France probably was slightly ahead of England in the distribution
of technical skills, and perhaps even in the general level of welfare.
It is important, therefore, to look for explanations which account
for these differences in the growth rates of the two countries, whose
over-all cultural, political, and economic situation did not differ very
profoundly in the early sixteenth century; and to explore the last-
ing effects of the differential rates and timing of economic growth
and the special features of the present economic conditions which
can be attributed to the differences in the time lag of the main eco-
nomic advances.
Among the explanations of Britain's forging ahead of the rest of
Europe has been one which has stressed her natural endowments,
notably her position as an outpost of Europe in the North Atlantic
and her favorable balance of raw materials. This theory has com-
monly been associated with Henry Thomas Buckle, but parts of it
have appeared in later accounts of British commercial and economic
supremacy.4 Although it is plausible that these environmental factors
played a significant role, the theory cannot be taken as a full
explanation of the differential growth of national outputs. The
See, for example, William Cunningham, Outlines of English Industrial His-
tory, Macmillan,1895, pp. 17-27, and Abbott Payson Usher, Industrial History
ofEngland,Houghton Muffin,1920,pp. 262 if.
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voyagefrom the North Atlantic coast of France to the New World
is not much longer than that from England. Moreover, the two
countries have fairly similar endowments of basic resources, which,
considering the magnitudes of output of various industries in the
eighteenth century, were ample in both countries. Britain attained
its early industrial growth in the production of woolen textiles and
of iron products and hardware. Even though Britain rather than
France was the homeland of sheep herding, France had access to
sufficient quantities of the raw material from domestic sources and,
if necessary, from imports from Spain. France's iron ores were as rich
and as abundant as England's, and for a significant period in the
development of this industry Britain was dependent on importing
large quantities of Swedish and Russian iron and even some Ameri-
can iron.5
Neither geographical position nor the endowment of agricultural
or mineral resources can thus fully account for the differences in
economic advancement in the two countries during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. In my opinion, the decisive factors
have to be sought rather in their respective social environments. Here
again, explanations for England's primacy have not been lacking.
Max Weber's thesis of the influence of the Protestant ethic on the
spirit of capitalism and hence indirectly on economic practice is
too well known to require extensive reiteration. But this thesis pro-
vides only an explanation of the general framework for these dif-
ferential growth processes rather than an analysis of the detailed
mechanisms involved. In order to obtain clearer insight it is necessary
to study the groups of persons who were the chief instrumentalities
5 According to the statistics on the British foreign trade in iron published
by Harry Scrivenor (History of the Iron Trade, London, Longman, Brown, Green
& Longmans, 1854, pp. 58 and 137), imports of bar iron rose from an average
of 15,642 tons annually in the period 1711-1718 to an annual average of
51,716 tons in 1788-1792 and 48,780 tons in 1793-1799. By the end of the
Napoleonic wars annual imports of bar iron had fallen to an average of 13,995
tons. British iron exports showed a steady increase from an annual average
of 4,365 tons in 1711-1718 to one of 29,446 tons in 1796-1805, and to one
of 91,772 tons in 1815-1822. Hence, the net import surplus of bar iron
amounted to 11,277 tons annually in 1711-1718, and 19,334 tons annually in
the last years of the eighteenth cenhiry. By about 1805-1810 Britain became a
net exporter of bar iron and in the period 1815-1822 showed an annual export
surplus of 77,777 tons. Most of the British iron imports came from the Baltic
area, and some allegedly even from Siberia (see the anonymous pamphlet The
Interest of Great Britain in Supplying Herself with Iron Impartially Considered,
London, Ca. 1750; see also the discussion of British iron imports in Ephraim
Lipson, The Economic History of England, London, A. & C. Black, 1931, Vol.
'I,pp.160-162).
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of this growth process, whose economic decisions were crucial to
it, and who bore the major risks of the advances and deserve the
major credit for them. Since the process of accelerated growth was
associated with a gradual transformation of the economy from de-
pendence chiefly on agriculture to dependence on industry, mining,
transportation, and commerce, we must look to these groups as
the main agencies of economic change. Furthermore, we should
expect that the role performed by such persons included not merely
the accumulation of capital and redirection of economic activity, but
also the introduction of technological and organizational innova-
tions. The innovating function is associated with entrepreneurial be-
havior, and considerable light may be shed on our problem by a
careful examination of entrepreneurship and its relation to capital
mobilization in Britain and France in the crucial two centuries from
about 1700 to 1900. The question may also be stated in another
form: What were the significant aspects of entrepreneurship in the
two countries? What impact did entrepreneurs(i.e. innovators)
exert on the general growth process of the economy? Finally, what
traditions of entrepreneurship which continued to affect innovation
and economic advancement even after the peak growth rates had
been passed were evolved in the two countries?
Although in the further course of this paper primary emphasis
will be laid on the role of entrepreneurs, the conditions under which
they acted, and the influences to which they were subjected, this
should not be interpreted to mean that entrepreneurship is to be
regarded as the sole significant variable in capital formation. Cer-
tainly, in the face of the economic advance of the Soviet Union and
of governmental attempts at induced development in many so-called
backward countries, it cannot be maintained that economic growth
without-entrepreneursisimpossible or that the main impetus
to economic progress always comes from private profit-seeking in-
dividuals. The experience of Britain and France is, therefore, not
universally applicable. It is not a part of the general social theory
but a description of particular historical processes.
Nevertheless, the stress on entrepreneurship and the comparison
of the processes and results of entrepreneurial activity in France
and Britain are valid because, within the capitalist society of West-
ern Europe, private entrepreneurs were regarded as the main car-
riers of innovations in productive techniques and forms of business
organization and the chief determinants in the use and allocation of
investment. Especially in the nineteenth century, when the greatest
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forwardsteps were taken in both countries, the position of entre-
preneurs as an economic elite was undisputed.
The attempt to deal with these questions stresses the appearance
in the unfolding industries of "new men" whose outlook and actions
were decisive in determining the nature of economic progress in
England and France. But the men themselves were influenced by
already existing traditions. They were born into a social order in
which behavior patterns in the economic field, as in others, were
relatively fixed, and, above all, in which considerations of social
prestige and even economic advantages were dependent upon spe-
cific political and legal institutions. These traditions, shaped espe-
cially in France by the impact of government, provide an important
clue to the relative backwardness of France in comparison with
England. They appear to explain why French entrepreneurship in
the eighteenth and even the early nineteenth century did not develop
as rapidly and as freely as in Britain, and why in the late nineteenth
century, when rapid strides forward were made in gross national
output, there evolved in France forms of ntrepreneurship different
from those in Britain.
2. The Development of French Entrepreneurship up to the
Endofthe Ancien Régime
In a short but brilliant article Henri Hauser has tried to interpret
the conditions which influenced French economic development under
the ancien regime.6 Although he does not explicitly discuss entre-
preneurship, his essay not only presents an explanation of the
patterns of French business behavior under the ancien régime but
also points to the sources of some of the rigidities which have per-
sisted in French entrepreneurial practice. Hauser thinks the financial
crisis of 1559, in which the Lyons credit market collapsed, was pro-
foundly important. The consequences of the crisis were aggravated
because price stability did not follow it. This resulted partly from
the impact of American specie which for the first time exerted a
strong influence on France and partly from the outbreak of the
religious wars which flared up and lasted for thirty years. A period
of unrest, monetary instability, and internal devastation ensued
which lasted three or four decades and which seriously unsettled the
French economy; it was probably of a magnitude comparable with
6"TheCharacteristic Features of French Economic History from the Middle
of the Sixteenth to the Middle of the Eighteenth Century," The Economic His-
tor/ Review, October 1933, pp. 257-272.
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that of the period in modern Germany comprising the inflation, the
Hitler regime, and the war. Entire social classes were deprived of
their substance; the small nobility witnessed the disappearance of its
money rents, on which it lived; the peasants, whose debt burden
would have been lightened in real terms by the inflation, were the
heaviest losers from the often wholesale destruction of fields, flocks,
and even villages. Such workers as there were fell victim to the in-
flation, since money wages proved to be sticky and trade union
organization was absent. Many emigrated to escape their misery.
In view of the terrible economic devastation which occurred, it
is no wonder that when peace was finally made during the reign of
Henry IV the institutions then created were influenced by the recent
violence. They also proved to be extremely hardy and durable—most
of them persisted all through the ancien régime, and some even
beyond. They were based on the assumption that France needed not
only a strong central government with the political function of main-
taining internal peace and securing the nation against the outside,
but also a strong and thriving economy, necessary for internal
stability and external power.
However, if the government was to fulfill its role adequately it had
to replenish the badly depleted exchequer and to assure an efficient
and flexible system of collecting revenues. Since almost all of the
taxes in force were excise and other indirect taxes (a situation not
uncommon in underdeveloped countries), the farming out of taxes
was considered, in the short run, to be the most effective way of
filling and periodically replenishing the exchequer. Thus the finan-
ciers who advanced money to the government and recouped their
advances by collecting taxes on their own account formed an im-
portant group in the country. Their political and economic signifi-
cance began to increase when municipalities adopted the same sys-
tem of tax collection. Extraordinary impositions by the crown and
other taxing bodies were continually growing; as a result, the finan-
ciers increased in number, prestige, and power. They acquired
wealth in order to buy government posts for their descendants. In
this way not only would they become lenders to the state and
recoup their loans from tax revenue, but if they could acquire a title
of nobility they would be exempt from most or all of the most
onerous taxes.
Thus tax farming became a very remunerative and desired busi-
ness career, which attracted a good part of the available entre-
preneurial talent. But since the net profits from this profession were
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constantly reinvested in titles of nobility or the purchase of govern-
ment posts, or spent in conspicuous consumption, bribes, and other
forms of nonproductive outlays, considerable portions of the na-
tional savings which flowed through the hands of the tax farmers
were never converted into productive investment. That part which
reached the government was spent for maintenance of the monarch,
for war, or for the many favorites in the royal bureaucracy. Only
a small part was actually put into schemes of amelioration, notably
transportation facilities, some land reclamation, and encouragement
and general subsidization of industry.
But not all Frenchmen could choose this relatively safe and re-
munerative way of making money through public service. Although
the Edict of Nantes gave Protestants theoretically equal rights in
government service, they were actually discriminated against and
were only reluctantly, and often with difficulty, admitted to govern-
ment positions. Moreover, after 1661 they were formally excluded
from admission to public service. Thus the large families in the
Protestant centers had no incentive to invest their capital in public
posts. For this reason Protestant rather than Catholic families tended
to build family businesses, to train their sons for business careers,
and to expand their business interests by prudent intermarriage.
Since the Huguenots formed the leading elite in French business, it
can easily be understood what a terrible blow was dealt to French
economic growth and to French entrepreneurship by the revocation
of the Edict of Nantes and the accompanying mass emigration of
French Protestants.
By the time of the Glorious Revolution, which in Britain saw the
mercantile class firmly seated in the saddle, the flower of French
entrepreneurship was destroyed. In the subsequent crisis Louis XIV
had to apply to foreigners or emigrated Protestants for many of the
financial and entrepreneurial services he needed.
Although the French Protestants formed the main group from
which the entrepreneurial class was drawn before their exile, the
political insecurity in which they lived made them look with favor
on certain types of investment and disparage and even avoid others.
They preferred investment in financial and commercial enterprises
to investment in manufacturing, especially in those industries—like
mining or iron smelting—in which capital requirements were high.
However, this does not mean that Protestants shied away from
manufacturing altogether. It was well known that they excelled in
several industries and that, with emigration, their industrial talents
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were transferred to Britain, Holland, and other countries where they
were eagerly accepted. But the insecurity of their position and the
likelihood that without notice they might lose the product of many
years of saving and work made them invest their capital in the most
mobile and most liquid forms. Thus where large capital accumulated
in French Protestant hands it was usually invested in financial and
commercial enterprises. Most of the Huguenot manufacturing enter-
prises were small artisanlike shops.7
These conditions account for the fact that private souràes supplied
capital for industrial development only in small quantities. They help
to explain why the government, in true mercantilist fashion, stimu-
lated industrial development indirectly by subsidies and directly by
the establishment of royal manufactures. The groundwork for this
policy had also been laid under Henry IV, whose councilor Bar-
thélemy de Laffemas was the paragon of a mercantilist statesman.
Although Sully and even Richelieu favored a greater degree of
freedom of enterprise, Colbert was firmly convinced that the pro-
motion of industry and the provision of employment were properly
within the province of royal power. Thus the system of royal manu-
factures was supplemented by a policy of public subsidization of
industry; this was an important avenue by which a portion of the
nation's savings found its way into industrial investment. The in-
tervention of the government in economic affairs in general, and in
the development of industry in particular, was so prominent that
the system has been called one of "state socialism."8
The interrelations of these factors account for the characteristics
of French entrepreneurship that appeared toward the end of the
ancien régime. The emigration of the Huguenots in the late seven-
teenth century and the many fateful wars of Louis XIV had been
blows which the country did not overcome until well after the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century. Industrial development doubtless
picked up and grew at a more rapid pace afterward. But the socio-
political system remained fixed. Most of the accumulated capital
'Theexcellence of the Huguenots in certain industrial fields and the bene-
fits derived by the countries to which they migrated have already been com-
mented upon by Samuel Smiles (The Huguenots, Harper, 1868, pp. 182-183).
See also Henry Se, L'Jvolution commerciale et industrielle de Ia France sous
l'ancien régime, Paris, M. Ciard, 1925, pp. 148-150.
8 See Prosper Boissonade, Le socialis-me d'etat, Paris, H. Champion, 1927,
which contains copious examples of public subsidization and guidance of
industry. There exist several monographs on various royal manufactures and
privileged industries in France under the ancien régime. A good bibliography
is contained in ibid., pp. 837 if.
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wasconcentrated in the hands of financiers or merchants who in-
vested it, if at all, in the expansion of their own enterprises and in
land. Enterprising individuals who might have struck out on their
own were seriously impeded, partly by the restrictions imposed and
tenaciously enforced by the artisans' corporations, and partly by
insufficient capital. Thus even after 1750, industrial development
depended to a large extent on securing government subsidies in the
form of loans, exemption from certain kinds of taxation, or a guaran-
teed income for the entrepreneur, all of them expedients which had
been practiced under Colbert.
Henri See sums up the privileges which were extended to these
entrepreneurs by saying that "manufacturers were conferred titles
of nobility sometimes" but that "most often they were granted in-
terest-free loans for their first plant, or even given workshops, or
the construction of machines was paid for." Similarly, workers in
privileged industries were exempted from certain taxes and other
burdens; in this way their living costs were reduced and entre-
preneurs were permitted to pay them lower wages.9 With varying
emphasis this remained the pattern all through the ancien régime.
An interesting example of it is afforded by the introduction of spin-
ning and carding machines in France by the English Milne family.
Not only were the Milnes enabled by a royal grant to establish their
textile machinery factory, but after it had been in operation for four
years the Duke of Orleans contracted with them to supply him ex-
clusively with their machines and put John Mime in charge of his
spinning factory at Montargis and the Englishman Foxiow in charge
of his other factory, at Orleans. This laid the groundwork for the
prosperity of the Milnes, who after the outbreak of the revolution
became large entrepreneurs in the French spinning industryY
In the iron industry royal subsidies played a similar role. The
establishment of the foundry at Indret, near Nantes, where cannon
were produced for the French navy, began through the collaboration
of La Houlière and the English ironmaster John Wilkinson. Wilkin-
son's original gratuity from the crown was 12,000 livres per year,
which later was raised to 50,000. His real rise began after he came to
know Ignace de Wendel, the founder of Le Creusot. Wendel had
See, op. cit., p. 134.
10CharlesBallot, L'introduction du machini.rine dens l'industrie françaLse,
Paris, F. Rieder, 1923, pp. 64-75. The royal subsidy to the Milnes consisted of
a lump sum of 60,000 livres (part of which was destined to repay the advances
made by their French sponsor), an annual gratuity of 6,000 livres, and a
premium of 1,200 livres for each device which they turned out.
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already obtained 600,000 livres for the construction of a large smelter
and foundry; when this establishment was finally built through the
joint planning of Wilkinson and Wendel in 1787, the stock company
of Le Creusot was formed. It had a total capital of 10 million livres,
and the king participated in it."
This pattern of industrial development was quite usual during the
second half of the eighteenth century in France. In southern France
the provincial estates and some members of the clerical hierarchy
were especially energetic in fostering industrialization, and even
small quasi-artisan workshops were not beneath their benevolent
notice. For example, in 1751 in the Provence the king granted an
annual subsidy of 12,000 livres for six years for the encouragement
of silk-spinners. At the end of this period, in 1757, an Arrét du
conseil d'etat ordered the imposition of an annual sum of 6,000
livres, for six years, on the towns of Marseille and Arles and sur-
rounding communities for the subsidizatiOn of silk-throwers. After
another six years, in 1763, this Arrét was renewed." Royal encourage-
ment was apparently contagious; the pressure of silk workers who
came to depend on these subsidies supported local authorities in
a movement to extend subsidization. In 1756 on the initiative of
the Diocese of Lavour and the Estates of Languedoc a factory pro-
ducing silk stuffs was erected and the Avignon merchant Jacques
Reboul put in charge. This activity of the provincial government
tended to grow. A commission of manufactures was set up which
annually screened large numbers of applications for subsidies. In
1759, for example, 3,000 livres was given to a manufacturer of
Nimes, another 3,000 livres to the dyer Eyman, 800 livres to the
Sieur Cily "for having set an example in using coal in the burning
of lime," etc.13
These examples could be multiplied in great number. Whether
the field is surveyed by industries or by geographical areas, the
crown's subsidization of industry was imitated by provincial estates
and sometimes by localaristocrats and members of the high clergy.
At the same time there was a growing acknowledgment of the tech-
11SeeBertrand Cille, Lea origines de la grande indsistrie metallurgique en
France, Paris, Editions Domat Montchrestien, 1947, pp. 193-199, and See,
op. cit., p. 292.
12SeeEmile Isnard, "L'industrie de la soie en Provence au XVIIIe siècle,"
in Mémoires et documents pour servir a l'histoire du commerce et de l'industrie
en France, Julien Hayem, editor, Paris, Hachette, 1917, Vol. xi, p. 21.
13SeeLeon Dutil, L'état économique du Languedoc a la fin de l'ancien
régime, Paris, Hachette, 1911, pp. 331-332 and 469.
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nologicalsuperiority of Britain. Prizes were given to those who either
succeeded in imitating British methods of production or surpassed
British skill by better methods, and British engineers and technicians
found France a fruitful and profitable field for their talents. In
addition to John and James Mime and John Wilkinson, other Eng-
lish entrepreneurs, especially technicians, were attracted to France
by special favors bestowed on them by the king's ministers. The
jenny for the spinning of wool was introduced principally by
English mechanics.14 Englishmen like Michael Alcock were active
in the metal trades; he set up a plant producing small metaiware at
Charité-sur-Loire. Another Englishman, Terry, founded an engraving
plant at Paris, and two Sheffield silver-platers, Rotheiham and Drellat,
set up a plant in Paris in 1790. Even John Kay, the inventor of the
flying shuttle, spent several years in France, where he attempted
to sell his inventions of a lace-making machine and a leather-stamp-
iisg machine to the government. His efforts failed and he returned
home disappointed.'
But the traffic in men also went on in the opposite direction. French-
men went to England to learn secrets of many trades and brought
innovations back with them. One of them was the "projector" Leturc
who was sent to England virtually under government orders as an
industrial spy. He took a false name and carried on his correspond-
ence in code. Another was Gabriel Jars, who traveled openly and
collected and published a series of valuable accounts of min-
ing and metal production° In addition, there were many small
artisans and workmen who spent some time in England studying
the new techniques in engineering, the metal trades, and textile-
manufacturing.'7
The general picture of French entrepreneurship and capital forma-
tion under the ancien régime may therefore be summarized in these
terms: Industrial development, to a large extent, was under the
tutelage of the state. While British mercantilism consisted primarily
of the regulation of foreign trade and shipping, and the control of
14 Ballot, op. cit., p. 178.
' Ibid., pp. 480-487.
16 On Letsjrc see ibid., pp. 273-277; also Gabriel Jars, Voyages métallurgiques,
3 vols., Lyon, G. Regnault, 1774-1781.
17 For example, a certain Gaulard-Desaudray visited Boulton and Watt in
Birmingham, a certain Lecour also spent some time at Birmingham to learn
the manufacture of polished steel objects, and there were many others. Ballot
(op. cit., passim) lists many engineers and workmen who traveled in both
directions to impart the more advanced techniques of Britain to France.
303HOSELITZ
foreign exchanges, in France the general supervision and control
of technological and industrial development were added to these
other features. In addition to the king and his ministers, a number
of aristocrats and high functionaries of the church showed their
interest in industrial development either by subsidizing existing
firms or by participating in newly established enterprises. Although
a certain amount of private initiative was evident, the role of the
government always remained paramount, and even continued in
influence after 1789, especially under Napoleon. The government
not only initiated new projects and imported engineering talent from
abroad; but also stood ready on many occasions to bail out enter-
prises which had incurred losses and to subsidize by various means
(e.g. exemption from certain types of taxation) enterprises which
could not otherwise have survived. French entrepreneurs came to
look upon the government as a force of central importance in the
national economy. The government and its appendages thus became
the most important institution through which the savings of the na-
tion were collected and mobilized for new investment.
This central role of the government doubtless enhanced the feel-
ing of dependence on government service and government subsidies
for new enterprises and contributed to the well-known aspiration to
attain a rentier status, which was, and still is, so typical of the French
middle class. The role of the government had yet another fateful
consequence. Since it tended to encourage industries whose products
found a relatively good market in France, and since in the royal
manufactures it placed primary emphasis on output which was dis-
tinguished by superior quality and taste, it encouraged two other
traditions which still play an important part in France. Instead of
looking for large but yet unknown markets and instead of maximiz-
ing total profits by mass sales with little unit profit, French entre-
preneurs came to seek earlier and more assiduously than British
or American entrepreneurs the relatively safe shelter of monopoly.
3. More Recent Developments in Entrepreneurship and Capital
Formation in France
At the end of the ancien ngime, when French industrial develop-
ment was profoundly affected by government regulation and sub-
sidization and by importation of foreign technologies, the first steps
toward the evolution of factory organization were taken. Under Na-
poleon these trends continued, on the whole, unabated. Napoleon's
reign may be regarded as the last stage in French mercantiism. The
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radical individualism proclaimed by the Revolution was repudiated,
and protectionism, even a species of bullionism, was the basic
principle on which the economy was built.18 Although the First
Empire formed an ideological anticlimax to the democratic radical-
ism of the First Republic, the middle classes had freed themselves
from many of the oppressive fetters with which they had been
burdened in the ancieri régime. Thus they found a potentially more
profitable field open for their economic activity. Nevertheless, we
should not be misled into believing that Jean Baptiste Say, who
translated the principles of Adam Smith to accord with French con-
ditions, correctly represented the dominant ideology of the French
industrial entrepreneurial class. Now as before, the latter submitted
willingly to the guidance and general supervision of the government,
which accepted these "responsibilities" as a matter of course. The
crowning act in this policy was the decree of June 26, 1810, in which
a Council of Factories and Manufactures was established and a large
inquiry into the state of French manufactures ordered. To be sure,
many of the members of the Council were large manufacturers—in
fact, its membership was a roster of the largest and most successful
entrepreneurs of that day. But apart from producers of textiles,
chiefly cotton textiles, and a few metallurgical entrepreneurs, most of
the big business leaders were merchants and financiers. Industrialists
continued to look to the government to bail them out in periods of
difficulty, and after the crises of 1806 and 1810-1812 the government
responded fully to these expectations. In both instancies Napoleon
tried to meet the crisis by more stringently enforced protectionist
measures, by loans or gift-loans of several millions of francs to
manufacturers, a large portion of which went to the largest firms,
and by the establishment of preferential market outlays for French
industry.'9
After the downfall of Napoleon the situation changed profoundly.
The governments of the Restoration were politically much weaker
than those of the ancien régime and of Napoleon. This is clearly
18AlexandreChabert, Essai sur le mouvement des revenus et de l'actlvlté
économique en France de 1789 il 1820, Paris, Librairie dc Médicis, 1949. On
the bullionist inclinations of Napoleon see Eli Heckscher, The Continental
System, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1922, pp. 71-73.
19Chabert,op. cit., pp. 333-342 and 361-384. One of the sales privileges
established for French industry was, for example, the decree of December 28,
1807, which prohibited the importation of cotton goods of other than French
origin into Italy (ibid., p. 368).
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shown by their sensitivity to the revolutionary movements of 1830
and 1848. Moreover, industrialism in France had reached a stage
at which it could not be expected to submit passively to govern-
ment regulation. Entrepreneurs were still• willing to accept bounties
and subsidies from the state, but they wished to receive these
benefits in a form similar to that demanded by their British counter-
parts. Low wages, government prohibition of labor unions, and a
system of taxation which interfered as little as possible with the
development of industry and yet provided sufficient protection for
the domestic market were the desiderata of the entrepreneurial
class. But although the government tried to meet these demands,
French industry, which was at an awkward stage of development,
could not make much use of the results. It had grown too big to be
placed under the full tutelage of the state, and at the same time it
had not developed sufficient traditions of independent initiative to
forge ahead rapidly and vigorously. Moreover, it was at this stage
that the disadvantages of industrial backwardness were felt most
strongly. Industrial technology in Britain had advanced to such
a degree that in many industries transfer of the most up-to-date
technology required the mobilization of relatively large sums of
capital. This was a task to which French entrepreneurs had never
been accustomed and which they were unable to meet. While in
Britain the initial stages in the development of the iron and cotton
industries had preceded the railway boom, in France the building up
of the entfre complex of basic industries in metalluEgy, textiles, food-
processing, and chemicals and the provision of more modern trans-
portation facilities had to be accomplished simultaneously.
At this point, only an innovation of grandiose proportions could
• have met thechallenge, and by a strange accident, or perhaps by
the logic of historical necessity, the men to make this innovation were
found. Grounded in the field of entrepreneurship with the longest
and most deeply rooted traditions in France, that of financial manip-
ulations, and inspired by a philosophy which extolled the advan-
tages and progressive character of a system of capitalist industrial-
ism, a new form of banking was evolved; this, more than any other
event, cut the Gordian knot binding the forces of industrial progress.
I refer to the formation by the brothers Péreire of the Credit
Mobilier, the first industrial investment bank in France and in the
world. This epoch-making innovation and its meaning for French
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economicdevelopment has recently been brilliantly described by
Gerschenkron, and all I can do here is paraphrase his words.2°
The investment bank of the Credit Mobilier type circumvented
several bottlenecks simultaneously. Above all, it succeeded in mo-
bilizing large amounts of capital for industrial development in a
form acceptable to French savers. Second, it overcame the shortage
of creative entrepreneurs, by undertaking the entrepreneurial func-
tions itself and reducing many of the actual managers of industrial
firms to executors of policies. Third, it introduced a method of
mobilizing investment which fitted smoothly into the prevailing pat-
terns of economic organization in France: it permitted the persons
who were supplying capital for, the financing of industrial develop-
ment to perform rentier roles to which they were accustomed.
Fourth, it maintained the symbol of financial supremacy over the
growing power of industrial entrepreneurship by placing a credit
institution in the position of industrial planner and developer and
reducing the industrialists to a rank of secondary importance.
Finally, it filled a painfully felt vacuum which had developed since
the fall of Napoleon by performing a function which before had
been performed by government. In doing all this it came into harsh
conflict with the representatives of "old wealth," the Rothschilds
and the Lafittes, who had followed on the whole the traditional
financial policies of being bankers to the government and profiting
from the financing of commercial and exchange transactions. Al-
though, as Gerschenkron points out, this conflict probably caused the
ultimate downfall of the Credit Mobilier, the victory for the repre-
sentatives of "old wealth" was worse than Pyrrhic. They gained be-
cause they became converted and adopted the methods of industrial
investment financing which the Credit Mobilier had introduced.21
The formula discovered by the brothers Péreire provided the
solution to the chief problems which had prevented more rapid eco-
nomic development not merely in France, but on the entire con-
tinent of Europe. In order to explore the consequences which an
institution like the Credit Mobilier had for the further development
of entrepreneurship in France, let us look at the general views on
industrialization and its relation to credit operations which the
founders of the Credit Mobiier held.
20SeeAlexander Cerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Per-
spective," in The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, Bert F. Hoselitz, editor,
University of Chicago Press, 1952, pp. 10 if.
21Ibid.,p. 11.
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Emile and Isaac Péreire were Saint-Simonians, and their intel-
lectual membership in this school of social thought is, I believe, of
fundamental importance for the understanding not only of their own
life work, but also of the nature of the impact which the Credit
Mobilier exerted on industrial entrepreneurship in France.
Saint-Simon is commonly regarded as a "socialist forerunner," an
interpretation which is too simple and ambiguous and does not
explain his position in the intellectual history of France. Neverthe-
less, it is a bitterly ironical trait of French intellectual history—and
perhaps an additional symptom of France's economic backwardness,
as compared with her intellectual maturity—that the Physiocrats, the
group of thinkers who extolled the sole productivity of agriculture,
were to become the apostles of capitalism, and that a man who
is generally typed as a "socialist forerunner" should have inspired
ideas which led to the development of institutions making pos-
sible the realization of industrial capitalism in France.
But we are concerned here with Saint-Simon's ideas on industrial-
ism and on the relation of credit to industry. The industrial system,
which was a somewhat idealized description of industrial capitalism,
was in his view the only one which would lead at the same time
to the physical and spiritual happiness of the masses of the people.
At the very center of this new industrial system stood the institu-
tions which provided credit. Money or money's worth was the meas-
ure of all things, and, depending upon whose interests were served
by the existing monetary and credit institutions, Saint-Simon stipu-
lated two opposing systems: the old system in which credit was
in the service of a centralized arbitrary anti-industrialist govern-
ment, and the new system in which credit was fully and exclusively
used to support the productive forces of society. However ambiguous
Saint-Simon may have been on many points—and there are harsh
contradictions even in some of his most fundamental definitions—his
doctrine of the place of credit was sharply and clearly defined.22
And Saint-Simon knew what he was talking about. His acquaintances
included the banker Lafitte, and his close friends included Lafitte's
associate Perregaux. Among his chief disciples were Enfantin, son
of a banker; Olinde Rodrigues, the director of the Caisse Hypothé-
caire; Duveyrier, son of a bank director and later editor of the,
22Aconvenient summary of the relevant theories of Saint-Simon on the two
systems and on the place of credit in relation to each may be found in L'oeuvre
d'Henri de Saint-Simon, Célestin Bouglé, editor, Paris, F. Alcan, 1925, pp.
136-173.
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journalCredit; and d'Eichthal, who also came from a prominent
banking family. These were the men with whom the brothers
Péreire associated in their youth and with whom they discussed the
role of banking and credit institutions in the new society.23
Here, then, must be sought the origin of the conceptions which
the Péreires formed about the place of an industrial investment
bank, and which they later realized in the Credit Mobilier. But it
is important to note that in the Saint-Simonian system the superiority
and very central position of the banker are emphasized. Although
the professions of the merchant and manufacturer were older, after
the "banking industry" appeared in the plans it soon took on the
unquestioned role of leader. These ideas were also reflected in the
procedures developed by the Péreires for their investment bank.
Industrial and commercial entrepreneurship were subordinate so
long as the unquestioned leadership of the captains of industry
who controlled the banks was assured. From the tutelage of the
crown, French industry—after an uneasy interval—had passed into
the tutelage of credit institutions. Again the financier was on top
and again the industrial entrepreneur was subordinate; again the
latter was looking for stimulation and, when things went badly, for
support from someone else. Again industry was made dependent
upon an organization which was more powerful and controlled
more wealth, which was more flexible and, because of its varied
investments, more farsighted than the industrial entrepreneur.
And just as in Britain the early joint stock companies had been
favored by the trend of the time into which they had been born,
and hence could fulfill the expectations held for them, the new
system of investment banking in France fulfilled the promises its
inventors bad made. It was the new type of banking which made
possible the construction of a railway network not only in France,
•but also in Spain, Austria, and Russia; it facilitated the urban re-
development of cities and the grandiose replanning of Paris under
Haussman; it helped domesticate industries in France which had
languished before or been beset by shortages of capital; it con-
tributed to make the fifty years in which it flowered the period of
the most rapid economic development which France ever witnessed.
But the fact that the brothers Péreire and the Credit Mobilier
lost out to the representatives of "old wealth," even though the
23 For Saint-Simon's associations with bankers and members of bankers'
families see Johann Plenge, Die erste Anlagebank: Gründung und Geschichte dea
Credit Mobiller, Essen, Baldeker, 1921, pp. 16-17.
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latter adopted their principles of banking, had an important in-
fluence on the future development of French entrepreneurship. The
experiment in banking represented by the Credit Mobiier may be
regarded as having exerted a double impact. On the one hand, it
was an innovation in the field of organization; on the other, it was
the carrier of a new expansionist ideology. Whereas the financiers
of long standing—Rothschild, Lafitte, and their ilk—adopted the
organizational form ushered in by the Credit Mobilier, they did not
also adopt its spirit, which still had a strong Saint-Simonian flavor.
It was inevitable that the new form of credit organization should
demand the extension of investment in industry, transportation
facilities, public utilities, and urban construction. The very momen-
tum imparted by the new banking organization carried its reforma—
tory effects beyond its own existence. But although the new practice
of investment banking demanded a constant accumulation of real
capital financed through the agency of the banks, the conservative
spirit of the representatives of "old wealth" gradually led to a re-
duction in the rate of capital formation and to an increasing prev-
alence of portfolio investments. For example, the French banks
participated in the financing of Russian railway expansion, but they
did this by lending money to the Russian government, which in
turn built the railways.
As a result, during the last 350 years French industrial entre-
preneurship, except in special cases, has never escaped entirely the
tutelage of either the state or large finance. I do not mean that
French industrialists developed no initiative on their own—a few
French industrial entrepreneurs could be cited who displayed a
spirit of venturesomeness which compares not unfavorably with
that of British businessmen of the Industrial Revolution or American
businessmen of the last three generations, who are customarily be-
lieved to represent the best traditions of entrepreneurship. But not
only were these men exceptional; they also had to operate in a social
environment in which imaginative venturesomeness was not sup-
ported by general tradition and by institutions facilitating this type
of social action. These factors seem to explain quite adequately the
rather stagnant situation of French entrepreneurship in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, which David Landes has so brilliantly
described.2
24Seethe following of his works: "French Entrepreneurship and Industrial
Growth in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History, May 1949,
pp. 45-61; "Business and Businessmen in France," in Modern France, Edward
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More recent evidence of this attitude is reflected in the complaint
of American observers about the relative lack of success of the
Mutual Security Administration in France. American cost-saving
techniques are freely adopted by French industrialists, but often
output is not expanded and the savings not passed on to consumers.
The lowering of costs through the adoption of new techniques, on
the contrary, often results in the layoff of workers and the main-
tenance of a given, relatively rigidly limited output, with an ac-
companying increase in unit profits. At the same time, inventiveness
and technical ingenuity are concentrated on the production of quali-
tatively better and artistically more tasteful products rather than on
the lowering of costs and the development of sales methods which
will insure mass sales.
In his analysis of the decline of classical capitalism, Sombart has
drawn attention to what he considers to be the paramount tension
in the economic ethic characteristic of the "spirit of capitalism." This
tension consists in the contrast between "rationalism and irrational-
ism, between calculation and speculation, between the bourgeois
spirit and the robber spirit, between prudence and venturesome-
ness."25 France, beginning with the ancien régime, abounded in
entrepreneurs who exhibited the first of these contrasting pairs of
attitudes. The French middle classes were rational, calculating, and
prudent, and they still form the archetype of the bourgeois. How-
ever soaring may have been French imagination in the fields of
literature and the arts, it remained close to earth in the field of
entrepreneurship. By contrast, however pedestrian the British, espe-
cially the Victorians, in the more exalted realms of human culture,
in economic matters they exhibited an astoundingly vigorous spirit
of venturesomeness, daring, and "irrationality" in Sombart's sense.
I will not judge whether these differences are the cause, or merely
symptoms, of the more rapid and farther-reaching economic advance
in Britain. But whichever they are, these differences are part of
general attitudes toward entrepreneurship and capital formation
which have deep traditional roots in the histories of the two coun-
tries, and which continued for a long time to impinge upon the
speed and direction of their economic development.
M. Earle, editor, Princeton University Press, 1951; and "Entrepreneurial Re-
search in France," Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, October 1950,pp.
35-43. See also John McDonald, "French Business Talks Back," Fortune, April
1952, pp. 120-121 and 178-188.
25 Werner Sombart, Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus, Berlin, Buchholz & Weiss-
wange, 1932, p. 8.
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4. Characteristics of British Entrepreneurship
and Capital Formation
In Great Britain the 200 years from the Glorious Revolution to
the end of the nineteenth century saw the formation of entre-
preneurial traditions and attitudes which were in sharp contrast to
those of France. Not only did genuine private entrepreneurship
develop in Britain on a large scale, but the mobilization of capital
for industrial development was channeled through private rather
than public institutions. This should not be interpreted to imply
that the British government in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies was not mercantilistic and jealous of its right to regulate
economic life. But regulation in Britain was confined chiefly to
international trade and those branches of the national economy
which were of overwhelming importance for the political fate of
the country, notably shipping and the provision of armaments and
other war material.
While the British government closely supervised and participated
in industrial development oniy in rare and specially selected cir-
cumstances, perferring to guide the economy by indirect means, the
general socio-economic situation in Britain also differed from that
of France in two other aspects. British guilds and corporations were
relatively waker than their French counterparts, and the internal
mobility of the population was much higher than in France. More-
over, the crown depended for its fiscal needs less on internal excises
and more on revenue from international trade and the granting of
commercial and industrial monopolies. The institution of tax-farm-
ing did not develop in Britain. One of the chief factors which pre-
vented such a development was the growing power of the middle
class in the British Parliament. It is a difficult historical task to
disentangle the reciprocal causal chains between the forms of taxa-
tion and methods of tax collection, on the one hand, and the growth
of middle class wealth and political power, on the other. British
merchants and industrialists could control the forms and burden of
taxation to which they were subject through their parliamentary in-
stitutions. At the same time they could maintain the supremacy of
Parliament, and its right to control the revenue demands of the gov-
ernment, because they occupied positions of economic power and
the crown therefore could not dispense with their collaboration or
acquiesence with impunity. The English revolutions of the 1640's
and 1688 conclusively established the stability of this internal bal-
ance of power.
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The role of the British government, however, took another direc-
tion. As in many countries with a young and growing industry,
entrepreneurs relied chiefly on two markets where an effective de-
mand, backed by readily available cash, appeared to exist. One of
these was the export market, the other the government's need for
supplies. The large companies selling British products abroad were
organizations through which British producers could readily dispose
of all or part of their output. The knowledge of the availability of
such (monopsonistic or oligopsonistic) demand conditions was con-
ducive, at least in part, to the development of certain industries,
notably textiles, certain chemical and metal products, and those
producing commodities demanded by the government. For ex-
ample, some of the most successful iron enterprises achieved their
important position in the industry because of contacts which they,
or certain partners in these firms, maintained with government
officials engaged in the purchase of cannon' and other war material.
These influences, which are generally similar to tendencies exist-
ing in currently underdeveloped countries, had an important bear-
ing on the industrial development of England chiefly because they
favored the development of certain industries as against others.
They account in large part for the relatively early development of
the textile and iron industries in Britain, and of "luxury" industries
in France. But this industrial development in Britain led to geo-
graphical decentralization and a shift of the center of gravity of
the population from the South and East of England to the North
and Northwest. One aspect of British economic development in
the eighteenth century was an extension of the internal geographical
frontier into new areas of settlement and the growth of new ag-
glomerations of population. The process was not merely one of
progressive growth of already existing urban centers. The towns
which at the end of the seventeenth century had been largest and
most important grew also, but at a much smaller rate than the new
towns.
The movement and geographical redistribution of the British
population before and during the Industrial Revolution have often
been described and need no repetition here.26 The point I wish to
stress, however, is that this internal reallocation of population meant
that industrial development proceeded on two fronts. In part, in-
26Seeesp. Arthur Redford, Labour Migration in England, 1800-50, Man-
chester, The University Press, 1926, pp. 8-17, 82-37, 48-53, and 175 if., and
maps in Appendix.
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dustry expanded in the old centers, where it built on akeady exist-
ing capital markets, on families already entrenched in certain trades
and on traditions of production and marketing, not to speak of the
guilds. At the same time industry developed in new areas, into
which entrepreneurs and workers poured from various parts of
Britain: these were areas into which large quantities of capital had
to be brought from the outside, and where new forms of enterprise
and new marketing relations could develop more easily and with
fewer impediments from traditional patterns and vested interests.
The development of the British iron industry is a good example in
point. The main center of iron production in the early eighteenth
century was the Black Country in the Midlands. The Weald (Sussex
and Kent) and the Forest of Dean (Gloucestershire) had already
passed their peak period. The forests were exhausted, and the
furnaces in these counties were smaller than the newer ones which
had been constructed in Staffordshire and Shropshire. In 1717, of
a total production of about 18,600 tons of iron, roughly 6,000 tons
were produced in the Midlands region (including North Wales),
about 5,500 tons in the Weald and the Forest of Dean combined,
2,100 tons in the East of England (notably Yorkshire and Derby-
shire), and 1,900 tons in South Wales. The remainder was produced
in scattered furnaces located in various parts of the country. Scotland
produced only negligible amounts of iron.27
The three regions which showed the greatest advance in iron
production in the following 120 years were the Midlands, South
Wales, and Scotland. The industrial weight of the Midlands as a
center of the iron industry was founded on their importance as a
fabricating rather than a raw materials center. During most of the
eighteenth century, Britain was a net importer of raw iron, and
only around 1805 did she become a net exporter of the crude prod-
uct. The chief consuming region of imported iron—most of which
came from the Baltic area—was the Black Country. For example,
much of the activity of Sir Ambrose Crowley, one of the pioneers of
the iron industry, consisted in trading raw iron to the Midlands area,
and Knight, one of the members of the Stour partnership, imported
American raw iron into the region as early as 1728.28
27Thisdistribution is based on the information listed in E. W. Hulme,
"Statistical History of the Iron Trade of England and Wales, 1717-1750,"
Transactions of the Newcomen Society, Vol. xx (1928-1929), p. 13.
28SeeMichael W. Flinn, "Sir Ambrose Crowley, Ironmonger, 1658-1713,"
Explorations in Entrepreneurial Hixtory, March 1953, p. 169, and R. L. Downes,
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Britain'sdependence on imported iron was regarded with alarm
by many mercantilist writers, who proposed a series of remedies.
Although early in the eighteenth century Abraham Darby of Cole-
brookdale had invented a process by means of which coke rather
than charcoal could be used in the production of pig iron, this
process spread slowly and did not gain general acceptance until the
third quarter of the century. Even before that time the main remedy
for the dependence on imported iron, and for the need to extend the
production of domestic raw iron, consisted in the construction of
new furnaces in relatively underdeveloped ore-rich areas where
there was also an abundance of water and forests. The early move-
ment of the iron industry to South Wales was motivated chiefly
by the relative lack of industrialization in the region, supported by
its favorable location and resource endowment.
Later, when the main problem of the iron industry was to have
coal readily available, the abundance of rich coal seams in South
Wales enhanced its value as an iron-producing region. Since further
technological development emphasized even more the need for coal,
the rise of the Welsh iron industry was assured. The abundance of
coal in the Midlands had similar effects. It is not surprising that by
1823 South Wales and the Midlands together produced 374,000 tons
of pig iron out of a total production in all of Great Britain of
455,000 tons.29
The great upsurge of British iron production began in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century. In the nine years between 1788
and 1796 the total output of pig iron almost doubled (from 68,300
tons to 125,100 tons); in the succeeding decade it doubled again (to
252,800 tons); in the next nineteen years it almost doubled once
more; and by 1839 it amounted to 1,248,800 tons, almost twenty times
the output of fifty years earlier. This great increase in iron produc-
tion was due to the rapid development of iron-producing facilities
in South Wales and the Midlands, and only toward the end of this
period did Scotland and Northeast England contribute significant
portions of the total production.
Although the general trends of growth of productive facilities for
the raw material were parallel in South Wales and the Midlands,
they exhibited one significant difference: the production of raw iron
'The Stour Partnership, 1726-36: A Note on Landed Capital in the Iron In-
dustry," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. m (1950-1951), No. 1,
p. 93.
29 See Scrivenor, op. cit., p. 135.
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in the Midlands was largely an appendage of the already established
fabricating plants. Productive facilities for the turning out of pig
iron were established and owned by individuals or partnerships
whose main interest lay in their control of iron-fabricating estab-
lishments. It was the engineering and hardware firms and the owners
of foundries and wire, nail, and plate factories who acquired control
over pig-iron-producing facilities. In South Wales, on the other
hand, fabricating was much less important. Its convenient location
permitted the easy transportation of the bulky raw product, and the
relative scarcity of skilled labor made the establishment of fabricat-
ing plants unattractive. To be sure, there were quite a few forges
and other plants there, but the major portion of investment in South
Wales was in production of the raw iron.
If we may use an analogy from the present, South Wales—a region
which, during this period at least, depended upon the exportation
of one or two raw, or at best semifinished, products—may be re-
garded as a "one-crop economy," and because of the relative recency
of its development, as compared with the older manufacturing cen-
ters of Britain, it exhibited some of the characteristics of a newly
developed country. It depended upon the rest of Britain for a part
of its manpower and for most of its capital and entrepreneurship.
Although there was mobility also into the Midlands, Yorkshire, and
elsewhere, the economic history of South Wales in the 100 years
between 1750 and 1850 may be regarded as typical of the process
of extending the internal frontier to new and relatively virgin ter-
ritories within Great Britain.
Another factor, the magnitude of the initial investment required,
makes the development of pig iron production in the period of the
Industrial Revolution a good example of the forms of capital forma-
tion and entrepreneurial recruitment in Britain. The English iron
industry was organized along capitalistic lines rather early, certainly
beginning with the quite general adoption in the sixteenth century
of Continental techniques of blast furnaces and water-powered ma-
chinery by English ironmasters. This was true of all stages of the
production process prior to fabrication.30 Even before the adoption
of Cort's techniques, the production of raw iron required relatively
large capital investments. The introduction of Cort's process was of
great importance to the growth of the industry because it reduced
costs markedly and permitted the substitution of coke-smelted front,
80T.S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution, London, Long-
mans, 1924, p. 4.
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forthe charcoal product. But this new process required the erection
of puddling furnaces and rolling mills and the use of more powerful
and complex engines, which in turn re4uired more reliable sources
of power than could be afforded by waterwheels. Thus the most
up-to-date production methods of bar iron in the late eighteenth
century called for steam engines which found an ever-widening ac-
ceptance in the industry.3
In addition to the increase in capital requirements necessary for
an efficient plant using the then most recent available technology,
the cost of mineral leases rose considerably. Since South Wales had
been a relatively unexploited region in the early eighteenth century,
the price rises for leases over time were especially great there. But
the rapid increase of iron production in other parts of Britain pro-
duced similar effects everywhere.82
Because the capital needs of the iron industry were relatively
large, its growth shows perhaps better than that of any other industry
the methods of capital accumulation and especially its concentrated
mobilization for the economic development of a relatively under-
developed area, such as South Wales. Some of the figures of the
capital needs of the iron industry even in its very early stages show
the magnitude of the capitalization required. The. most important
partnership of the Midlands iron industry in 1692, composed of five
men, owned four active and one defunct furnace, six forges, three
slitting mills, and a storehouse at Bedley. The total capital contrib-
uted to the partnership was £.36,277. In 1700 another partnership,
associated with it, operated two furnaces, three forges, and a plat-
ing mill. The partners were credited on the books of the company
with a "stock" of
31Between1775 and 1800 Boulton and Watt erected 325 steam engines, of
which 37 were in foundries and forges. The engines in iron works were larger,
on the average, than those in other types of production. While the average
horsepower of all machines erected by Boulton and Watt in this period was
slightly above 18.5, those in the iron industry had an average of 28 horsepower.
Some of the largest among them had close to 50 horsepower. Cf. John
Lord, Capital and Steam Power, London, P. S. King, 1923, pp. 172-175.
32Forexample, the annual rent of the lands on which the Plymouth furnace
(in South Wales) was eventually to be established was £60 in 1765. In 1786
this rental had risen to £268 for a slightly larger piece of land. Similarly, the
rent for the land at Ynyscedwyn on which a furnace and two forges had been
established in 1723 amounted to £7 per annum. Thirty years later the leases
were renewed at an annual rent of £30. Cf. John Lloyd, The Early History of
the Old South Wales Iron Works, 1760-1840, London, Bedford Press, 1906,
pp. 5-6 and 75.
38SeeB. L. C. Johnson, "The Foley Partnerships: The Iron Industry at the
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But during the ensuing fifty years the costs of erecting and putting
an iron works into operation with furnaces, smelters, and forges
increased considerably. In 1812 Thomas Attwood testified that a
complete iron works could not be constructed for less than £50,000.
In 1789 the Bleanavon iron works were established in South Wales
with three furnaces at an actual cost of £40,000, and the two
furnaces which were erected in 1794 at the Nantyglo works (South
Wales) cost £27,316.
If we consider that the number of furnaces in South Wales in-
creased from 14 in 1788 to 197 in 1852 and that the number in the
Midlands in the same period rose from 33 to 220, we can gauge
the magnitude of the capital accumulation process concentrated in
this short period. Furnaces were not all. They had to be supple-
mented by forges, by slitting and rolling mills; and costly mineral
rights and leases on land had to be acquired. To this should be
added investment in transport facilities such as canals and roads, a
portion of which was borne by the entrepreneurs in the iron industry.
These considerations raise two important questions. How was such
a vast amount of capital mobilized and what people were entrusted,
or found themselves, with its control? Mechanisms for the raising
of large quantities of capital were, of course, not unknown in
Britain at that time. The overdrafts allowed to the East India Co.
by the Bank of England at the beginning of the eighteenth century
amounted to £20,000; by the 1760's they had risen to £200,000
and even £300,000. Similarly, the South Sea Co. was' allowed an
overdraft of £150,000 in 1726, and even in the 1750's when its
mercantile activities had declined to a shadow and the company
had become a "mere handler of annuities" its drawing right with
the Bank of England amounted to £50,000. These credits were
given, it should be noted, only to companies, and even among these
only to the strongest and most powerful ones. At the time the East
India Co. obtained the right of overdraft exceeding £200,000 it
had gained political supremacy in India, and for all practical pur-
poses performed the functions of political government as well as
trade.
End of the Charcoal Era," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. iv (1951-
1952), No. 3, pp. 326 and 329.
See Ashton, op. cit., p. 163; Lloyd, op. cit., p. 160; and A. H. John, The
Industrial Development of South Wales, 1750-1850, Cardiff, University of
Wales Press, 1950, p. 25.
See J. H. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History, Cambridge, Eng.,
The University Press, 1945, Vol. x, pp. 117-121.
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Butapart from the experience of the great and powerful compa-
nies, the credit market for merchants was, on the whole, much better
developed than that for fixed investment in industry. In part this
was due to the fact that as long as most industrial investment was
rather small, the actual demand of merchants for capital to finance
their inventories was larger than the demand of small industrialists
for fixed capital. This appears quite clearly in many sources originat-
ing in the eighteenth century. For example, in an anonymous little
book which appeared in 1747 describing the various trades, the
differences in the requirements of capital between a working jeweler
and a trading jeweler is indicated in the following words: "To set
up a Master, who only works for others, will want no more than £20,
but a Dealer in Diamonds, etc. must have Cash in proportion to his
stock."36 This observation of our anonymous author appears to hold
for the majority of industries of the time. Heaton explains the rarity
of factories in the earlier stages of the Yorkshire woolen industry, in
part, by the absence of large sums of capital available for industry,
and by the fact that whatever capital was available in northern
England usually would be invested in commerce.37
During this period a large part of English industry was still in a
quasi-artisan stage. If we scan the list of occupations and the capital
investment needed which the anonymous author of A General De-
scription of All Trades gives, we find that in many industries between
£50 and £200 is all that is required to set a person up in business.
In some exceptional cases as much as £500 may be required. How-
ever, the writer of the booklet points out that "those who keep Forges
or Foundries, deal in Bar-iron, and export and import much, employ
thousands [of pounds]."
36A General Description of All Trades Digested in Alphabetical Order, Etc.,
London, T. Wailer, 1747, PP. 122-123. Similar differences in capital require-
ments are also indicated for button-makers and button-sellers (p. 48), uphol-
sterers who only fabricate and those who also engage in trade (p. 215), and
many other trades. That the capital requirements of traders as compared with
manufacturers were generally much larger is confirmed also by R. Campbell,
The London Tradesman, London, T. Gardner, 1747, and by R. B. Westerfield,
"Middlemen in English Business, 1660-1760," Transactions of the Connecticut
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 19 (1915), pp. 111-445.
Herbert Heaton, The Yorkshire Woollen and Worsted Industries, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1920, p. 90.
38A General Description ..., ascited, P. 126. Apart from persons engaged
in trade, who usually are considered to need a minimum of £500 and more
often £1,000 to set themselves up in business, the only industries with capital
requirements of a magnitude comparable to that of the iron industry and other
forms of the metal trades are brewing ("many Thousands"), distilling ("a500
at least"), printing ("from £1000 to£5000"), dyeing ("from £500 to
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Thus only few manufactures at that time had passed from an
artisan-type scale of organization to a factory scale. The iron indus-
try and, closely following it; the manufacture of cotton textiles were
paving the way for the advance of large-scale industrialism in
Britain. In fact, the very extension of the internal economic frontier,
coupled with the development of capital-intensive industries at the
geographical margin (iron in Wales, Scotland, and North England;
cotton in Lancashire and later in Scotland), seems to have facilitated
the introduction of factory production. Here industrial production
was so undeveloped that no local traditions, local guilds, and craft
groups stood in the way of the factory. Here experimentation with
large-scale production was easier than in the older industrial centers,
where traditional industrial techniques were more firmly established.
The technological innovations in the iron and cotton industries
also made necessary the introduction of factory methods in estab-
lishments located in the older industrial centers. While the transition
from small-scale handicraft and the putting-out system to the
factory system was slower in these older areas, the new form of
industrial organization was gradually transmitted from the geo-
graphically marginal parts, where the Industrial Revolution took
place more abruptly, to the older industrial areas around London,
Birmingham, Sheffield, Bristol, Nottingham, Coventry, and else-
where.
Simultaneously with the development of large-scale investment in
the geographically marginal areas there occurred an innovation in
the financing of industry. The partnership had been an early form
of mobilizing large amounts of capital in the iron industry and of
minimizing the risk of any one participator. Elaborate descriptions
of the Stour partnership, the Foley partnerships, and the partner-
ship operating iron works in the Furness district show that this form
was applied early in the iron industry, primarily because of the
vertical organization prevailing there. Although some of these early
partnerships owned and operated more than one works, the typical
arrangement of assets was the ownership of furnaces, smelters, forges,
warehouses, and often various types of fabricating plants.39 This
£2000"), shipbuilding ("generally a large Undertaking, for which Reason it
is fittest for Money's men to engage in"), soap-boiling (. 2,000), and one or
two others (from ibid., pp. 35, 80, 29, 83, 189, and 196, respectively). On
capital required in industry see also J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of
Modern Britain, Cambridge, Eng., The University Press, 1926, Vol. x,p. 68.
89SeeJohnson, op. cit.; Downes, op. cit.; A. Fell, The Early Iron Industry of
Furness and District, Ulverston, H. Kitchin, 1908; Arthur Raistrick and E.
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patternof establishing partnerships was extended to South Wales.
But since there was little opportunity for vertical organization of
the industry, partnerships soon acquired several works located near
one another, and some had holdings comprising works not merely
in the South Wales area, but also in the Midlands, Yorkshire, and
elsewhere. The development of this type of control is exhibited by
the fact that in 1788 there were 14 works with 17 furnaces and with
25 persons in entrepreneurial positions in South Wales. In 1806
there were 24 works with 48 furnaces and with 47 persons in entre-
• preneurial roles, and in 1823, 19 works with 72 furnaces and with 35
entrepreneurs. After 1823, joint stock companies were organized in
the iron industry and the old pattern of partnerships receded. By
the middle of the nineteenth century the partnership in this in-
dustry was, on the whole, a thing of the past.
The development of partnerships and horizontal combination in
the industry facilitated and indeed suggested the formation of joint
stock companies, which up to 1825 had been absent from the iron
industry and had prevailed chiefly in commercial, canal, and other
transportation companies. Today a primary distinguishing feature
of joint stock companies is the limited liability of their shareholders.
But this was not always the case in Britain. In fact, the right of
limited liability of registered stock companies was established uni-
versally only by an act of 1885. The main differences between the
partnership and stock company were the greater number of partners
in a stock company and the fact that the members of a partnership
were usually more actively engaged in administering the business of
their firm than were the members of a stock company. The stock
company permitted the accumulation of larger amounts of capital
and drew moneys into fixed industrial investment from persons who
had neither the interest nor the inclination to engage actively in
managerial roles, but who sought chiefly a profitable return on their
capital.°
The industrial joint stock company in its pre-1885 form in Britain
represented, therefore, an organization appropriate to a system in
Allen, "The South Yorkshire Ironmasters, 1690-1750," Economic History Re-
view, May 1939, PP. 168-185; and, summarizing this trend, Ashton, op. cit.,
pp. 48 if. and Chap. vii, passim.
40Agood short description of the nature of stock companies in the nineteenth
century in Britain and the trends leading to the further development of a
joint stock company structure is given by Geoffrey Todd, "Some Aspects of
Joint Stock Companies, 1844-1900," Economic History Review, October 1932,
Pp. 46-71.
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which risk-taking as a social function had become institutionalized.
The earlier partnerships, made up entirely of private individuals
and financed by the capital of these same individuals, were the first
institutions in this process which necessitated the concentration of
relatively large amounts of capital.
The mobilization of large quantities of capital in the form of fixed
assets in industry differs profoundly from an accumulation of capital
of similar magnitude in trade or finance. In the latter much of the
capital is invested in assets with a relatively quick turnover, and
although the total risk may be high, the degree of liquidity is also
relatively high. Moreover, the economic horizon of persons invest-
ing in commerce or finance usually is narrower than that of persons
who sink large sums into the construction of such relatively durable
assets as furnaces, forges, puddling and rolling mills, and mines. The
large-scale industrial entrepreneur and later the industrial stock
company committed themselves more fully to an uncertainty-bear-
ing function than did the investor in a commercial partnership or
company.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the great entrepreneurs of the
Welsh iron industry of the late eighteenth century—the period when
rapid development on a vast scale occurred in that part of Britain—
were individuals who possessed most clearly the characteristics of
the risk-taking, innovating entrepreneur of the textbooks. Although
as prudent men they avoided overly great gambles—a factor which
accounts, for example, for their preference for lease rights to coal-
and ore-bearing land as against outright purchase of the land—they
were obviously taking immense risks, and they understood, and
apparently were fully conscious of, this role. The absence of local
financial institutions which could have supplied the necessary loan
funds for industrial development and the apparent unwillingness of
metropolitan bankers to venture their funds in the risky iron enter-
prises in South Wales enhanced the sentiment of self-reliance and
individualism of these pioneers. How else can we interpret the
statement of one of the most successful South Wales ironmasters,
Richard Crawshay, the "Iron King," when he said, "I shall not take
any partners as long as I live."41 Samuel Homfray, another pioneer
in the South Wales iron industry, apparently was a gambler on
occasion; after having helped finance the locomotive of. the Cornish
engineer and investor Trevithick, he bet Crawshay £1,000 that it
41John,op. cit., p. 57. Similar statements of individualist confidence and
optimism are cited there.
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could convey a load of iron by steam power from the Pennydarren
iron works to the Glamorganshire Canal, nine miles away. He won
the bet.42 The career of Samuel Homf ray's brother, who was knighted
in 1810, bankrupt in 1813, and a coal magnate prior to his death,
bespeaks no risk shyness.43 But not only were these entrepreneurs
willing to take financial risks; they constantly adopted technical in-
novations and were prepared to reinvest profits. Scrivenor wrote of
the extension of the South Wales industry in the first half of the
nineteenth century that the speculative mania and extravagant
establishment and extension of plant, notably by the joint stock
companies, would bring about the ruin of the industry.44
The most successful and at the same time the most typical of
all these men was Anthony Bacon, who began as a coal merchant
in Whitehaven, emigrated to Maryland, returned to London to
become a merchant, contracted with the government to supply
British garrisons in Africa, entered Parliament when American af-
fairs were under discussion, furnished African Negroes to the gov-
ernment in the West Indies, acquired a small fleet of ships, and
started coal-mining in South Wales. The outbreak of the American
Revolution gave him an opportunity to supply cannon to the British
army, which in turn spurred on his efforts to establish himself more
firmly in the iron industry. His business interests included grants of
coal mines in Cape Breton, estates and fisheries in the colonies, and
a series of partnerships and other connections with politically in-
fluential people, which made it possible for him to obtain repeated
orders from the government for supplies of food, war material, coal,
and other things. Bacon was a captain of industry par excellence. He,
more than anyone, must be credited with having opened the
Rhondda Valley to economic exploitation.
Men like Bacon, Crawshay, and the Homfrays set the pace. They
formed the backbone of the industrial partnerships which developed
the iron industry in an outlying, relatively undeveloped region. They
were the people who were willing to take great risks, but whose
expectations of profit were self-confirming in an age in whiCh the
42 See Lloyd, op. cit.,p. 88, and C. Wilkens, The History of the Iron, Steel,
Tinplate, and Other Trades of Wales, Merthyr Tydfil, J. Williams, 1903.
See John, op. cit., p. 34.
"Scrivenor, op. cit., pp. 280-283.
"See the stimulating sketch of Bacon's life by L. B. Namier, "Anthony Bacon,
M.P., an Eighteenth-Century Merchant," Journal of Economic and Business
History, November 1929, pp. 20-70.
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entire economy experienced rapid growth. There were setbacks and
occasional bankruptcies; but, on the whole, the expectations of large
profits materialized, and this encouraged others—lawyers, merchants,
and evew clergymen—to entrust their funds to these industrial pio-
neers. The supply of capital funds became so great after the first
important successes in the Welsh iron industry that the result was
the development of the joint stock companies and lavish extension of
plant, which, as we have seen, was regarded with some misgivings
by Scrivenor.
The most adequate characterization of the shifts in the type of
entrepreneurship developed in this industry can be gauged by a
comparison of the occupational backgrounds and geographical ori-
gins of Welsh ironmasters at different periods of time. As long as
the industry was small, local people—landlords and artisans—pre-
dominated. When the merchants from the old commeráial centers
became attracted to the industry it started its period of phenomenal
growth. Of seven persons who were known to have held entre-
preneurial positions in the Welsh iron industry in 1723, four were
landowners, one a merchant, and two ironmasters. Of the twenty-five
persons in entrepreneurial positions in 1788, nine were merchants,
thirteen ironmasters, two entrepreneurs in other industries, and one
a manager in iron works. Not one was a landlord. The occupational
characteristics of 1788. remained fairly stable throughout the rest
of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. Half
of the entrepreneurs had started as merchants, and the other half
as engineers, small masters, or managers in the iron industry or re-
lated industries (such as copper, brass, tin plate manufacture, or
engineering).
As to their geographical origin, five of the seven entrepreneurs in
South Wales iron works in 1723 were natives of South Wales, one
came from London, and one from the Midlands. Of the thirty-five
entrepreneurs in the South Wales iron industry in 1796, ten were
natives of South Wales, four came from Bristol, six from London, ten
from the Midlands, and five from elsewhere. If we combine the two
classifications we find that most of the local entrepreneurs in the
early period were landlords, but that by the end of the eighteenth
century most of the South Wales natives were ironmästers. Of the
persons coming from outside the area, most of the immigrants from
London and Bristol were merchants, and so were a few from the Mid-
lands. But the bulk of the persons originating in the Midlands were
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ironmasterswho transferred their field of activity to the newly
developing region.4°
This provides a fairly clear clue to the origin of the capital which
flowed into the industry. The land was supplied by local landlords,
who also contributed capital for the construction of canals and other
means of transportation to make the region more accessible. Since
little fabricating was carried on in South Wales, and since it de-
veloped into one of the major exporting areas of coal and of bar
iron, facilities for out-shipment were of the utmost importance. Most
of the capital for investment in furnaces, forges, and other plant
equipment was supplied by merchants (many of them iron or coal
merchants, but some cloth merchants and others) from London and
Bristol. Of special importance were some Bristol Quakers whose
business connections reached not only into the South Wales iron
industry, but also into the Midlands and North Wales iron industry.
The famous Darby family which set up the works at Coalbrookdale
originated in Bristol, and many other well-known Midlands Quakers
in the iron trade had close connections with their coreligionists
among the Bristol merchants. As the eighteenth century drew to
an end, the Bristol merchants began to be eclipsed by London mer-
chants who eventually came to dominate the industry financially.
Technical and engineering talent was supplied chiefly from the Mid-
lands, but after the industry had been domiciled for some time in
South Wales, native engineers and ironmasters tended to reach
entrepreneurial positions in it.
What general conclusions can be drawn from this account of the
development of the iron industry in a region which early in the
eighteenth century was "underdeveloped" and which in the course
of some 120 years became one of the most highly capitalized manu-
facturing regions of Britain? Most of the capital—apart from land—
which was needed to develop the industrial complex had to be sup-
plied from the outside, and by the nature of the factory type of enter-
prise, large individual chunks of capital were needed. These could
only come from the government, the aristocracy, or already wealthy
merchants. It was the latter who provided the bulk of the needed
46Thesedata, as well as other information contained in this essay on entre-
preneurship in the South Wales iron industry, are drawn from an as yet un-
published paper, "The Geographical and Occupational Origin of South Wales
Ironmasters, 1717-1889," which is being prepared by Marshall Kolin.
See two works by Arthur Raistrick; Dynasty of Iron Founders: The Darbys
and Coalbrookdale, London, Lorigmans, 1953, pp. vii-vili and 88-85, and
Quakers in Science and Industry, London, Bannisdale Press, 1950, passim.
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funds, in a surge of innovating and enterprising spirit whose origins
are somewhat of a mystery. Once the early ventures proved success-
ful, the flood of capital offered for investment increased, and at
times even led to perhaps untimely expansion of the industry. But,
on the whole, the steadily increasing demand for iron and steel
products created by the railway age confirmed the expectations of
the profitability of such investment and produced recurring waves
of new capital.
Most of the early entrepreneurial talent also came from outside the
region. The merchants stepped into financial, organizational, and
managerial positions, and the ironmasters who had gained their early
experience elsewhere filled the leading technical and supervisory
posts. Although many of these men started from fairly small be-
ginnings, few actually rose from the, very bottom of the social scale.
Most of the Welsh ironmasters came from merchant families or were
sons of small manufacturers; only a few had yeoman or peasant
parents, and hardly any came from working class families. Neverthe-
less, the recruitment of entrepreneurial talent for the industiy sug-
gests the persistence of a degree of geographical and social mobility
of a substantially higher order than was the case in France at that
time and even later.
This picture of the development of entrepreneurship and formation
of capital in the South Wales iron industry resembles analogous
contemporary processes elsewhere in the industrially undeveloped
parts of Britain. The growth of the Scotch iron industry, which did
not start on a significant scale until after the middle of the eight-
eenth century, followed similar lines, and a superficial survey of the
evolution of cotton-spinning and -weaving in Lancashire and else-
where in North Britain appears to show similar characteristics.
In the other industrial centers economic development showed some
contrast to this pattern notably with respect to the source of capital
and the rapidity of factory development. In 1926 Sir John Clapham
wrote of London that "to this day [it] is the home of small busi-
nesses," and of Birmingham it was said in 1799 that, comparing its
manufactures with those of Leeds and Manchester, "there are very
few that may be called large capitals. There are many manufactories
in Birmingham which do not employ £100; some about £1,000, and,
speaking in general of the higher descriptions of manufactures, about
6 or £7,O00." Similar observations can be made about other older
48Clapham,An Economic History of Modern Britain, as cited, Vol. i,p.68;
and Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, London, 1803, Vol. x,
Miscellaneous Subjects: 1785-1801, p. 663.
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centers of industrial production, such as Sheffield, Bristol, Coventry,
and Norwich. In these places a substantial portion of industry de-
veloped more or less gradually out of the earlier artisan-type organi-
zations. The capital needs for enterprises on such a relatively small
scale could often be met out of the earnings of the masters them-
selves. This facilitated upward movement in the social scale, and
since the rigid social structure characteristic of medieval society had
broken down in Britain long before the Reformation, a large amount
of vertical social movement actually occurred. Hence, in the early
stages of British industrial development many factory masters started
as artisans or workmen and in the course of their lives changed from
that status to one of industrialists or masters. For example, William
Hutton says of Birmingham that in 1793 there were 94 persons in
that town who possessed more than £5,000, 80 who had £10,000,
17 with £20,000, 8 with £30,000, 7 with £50,000 and 3 with up-
wards of £100,000. He adds that out of these 209, "103 began the
world with 'nothing but their own prudence; 35 more had fortunes
added to their prudence, but too small to be brought into account;
and 71 persons were favoured with a larger, which, in many in-
stances, is much improved."4° Similarly, Boulton said that "all the
great manufacturers that I have ever known have begun the world
with very little capitals."5°
The life histories of most of these entrepreneurs are, of course,
very difficult to reconstruct in sufficient detail to account for the
degree of vertical mobility that existed. The South Wales iron-
masters, whose early origins I have tried to ascertain, started from
somewhat more affluent circumstances than was often believed or
granted. That myth sometimes intervenes to make a dramatic story
even more dramatic is evidenced by the way some of the most dis-
tinguished historians treat the career of some spectacular figure
who has risen decisively in the social scale. The career of Ambrose
Crowley may serve as an illustration. Lipson writes of Crowley that
he "began his career as a working blacksmith and ended it as a
knight, an alderman and sheriff of London, and a member of Parlia-
ment."51 The implication of this statement is clear. We are presented
° History of Birmingham, 4th ed., 1809, pp. 136-137, cited in Henry Hamil-
ton, The English Brass and Copper Industries to 1800, London, Longmans,
1926, p. 271.
50 Cited in Hamilton, op. cit., p. 271, note. Hamilton lists still other opinions
in the same vein and some further evidence on both the smallness of maiiy of
the Birmingham enterprises around 1800 and the fact that their owners had risen
from lowly status and accumulated all or most of the capital by their own thrift.
51 Lipson, op. cit., Vol. n, p. 176.
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with a man who started as a simple small artisan and became one
of the greatest merchants and ironmasters of his day. But Michael
W. Flinn, who has more recently studied the career of Crowley,
contradicts Lipson's statement about Crowley's origins. In fact, he
explicitly says that Crowley's "origins were by no means as obscure
as has been suggested; he did not began his working life as a
common smith. He was born. ..theson of a prosperous ironmonger
of the same name."52 We would find, I trust, many other life histories
which have been somewhat overdrawn in a similar manner, and I
believe it would not be too far wrong to regard the statements of
Hutton and Boulton as somewhat exaggerated. They were expressing
as fact what in their day was widely believed. Even if these ac-
counts of the lowly beginnings of many men who became captains of
industry are perhaps not fully accurate in all details, they neverthe-
less provide evidence that the rise of men from poverty to great
riches was considered quite possible and indeed a not infrequent oc-
currence, and that vertical social mobility was common and accepted
without question.
Vertical mobility in the recruitment of entrepreneurs seems to
have been a characteristic of British industry which never fully
died out and which to this day has been an essential force in pro-
viding industry with vigorous new blood. In an investigation under-
taken shortly before the outbreak of World War. I on the social
origins of directors and managers in the cotton industry, Chapman
found that a large percentage of entrepreneurial and managerial
personnel both in manufacturing and spinning establishments rose
from the position of operative or clerk. In about 1911 he sent out
248 questionnaires asking for the occupational origin of entre-
preneurial personnel in the cotton-manufacturing, cotton-spinning,
and doubling industry. He received 179 replies. Among those re-
plying, 141, or 79 per cent, indicated that they had risen from low
positions to those of manager, owner, or member of the board of
directors. This study exhibits such an astounding degree of vertical
mobility that its findings must be accepted with great caution.53
Chapman's study is more important for its ideology than for
its facts. This same belief in the necessity of an open social order
is revealed in a recent account of British entrepreneurship by
52FJjpn, op. cit., p. 183.
See S. J. Chapman and F. J. Marquis, "The Recruitment of the Employing
Classes from the Ranks of the Wage-Earners in the Cotton Industry," Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, February 1912, pp. 293-313.
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Richard Fry, financial editor of the Manchester Guardian. Fry may
ceitainly be regarded as a witness who expresses the predominant
sentiment of British entrepreneurs about their own social role, their
function, and the ladder of ascent leading to positions occupied by
business leaders. Although he did not make a statistical study, as
Chapman did, providing us instead with impressionistic glimpses
of the social milieu of modern British entrepreneurs, he appears
to be a strong adherent of the rags-to-riches story. He begins his
account by picking out four "typical" successes of the interwar
period. These four are Lord Nuffield, who before World War I "had
a bicycle shop in Oxford"; Bernard Westfall, "a parson's son" who
studied at Cambridge on a scholarship and "in 1922 went as a
factory clerk" to a printing firm; William Butlin, who at fifteen went
to Canada as a drummer boy and when he was twenty-one "worked
his way across, arriving with £5 in his pocket"; and Jack Bilimeir,
who "started work at 14 (in 1914) in a shipbroker's office at 8 s. a
week." Elsewhere in his article he mentions other 'typical" cases,
such as that of Arthur John White, whose life story also falls in the
rags-to-riches class."
I do not imply that Fry's facts are wrong. I wish to stress, however,
that since the stories he relates are regarded by him as "typical,"
it appears that there is widespread unquestioning acceptance of the
tradition that many of the most successful entrepreneurs were boot-
blacks, newsboys, or close to that status at some time early in their
careers and that they rose from the very bottom of the social scale
to the very top. I am not aware that a careful study of the social and
occupational origins of British entrepreneurs has ever been under-
taken. Chapman's essay, although conceived in the true scientffic
spirit, is too limited in scope and is methodologically too defective to
count. Haxey's book55 provides some interesting source material of
a gossipy kind, but cannot be regarded as a serious study of the
social characteristics of British entrepreneurs as a class. In any case,
from the works of Taussig and Joslyn, William Mffler,56 and others
on the characteristics of the American business elite, we have reason
"See Richard Fry, "The British Business Man: 1900-1949," Explorations in
Entrepreneurial History, November 1949, pp. 85-48.
See Simon Haxey, Tory M.P., London, Gollancz, 1939.
88F.W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, American Buriness Leaders: A Study in
Social Origins and Social Stratification, Macmillan, 1932, and William Miller,
"American Historians and the Business Elite," Journal of Economic History,
November 1949, pp. 184-208.
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to doubt that the instances that Fry reports are "typical" of British
entrepreneurs as a whole.
Nevertheless, as long as enterprises were small, mobility upward
from the position of operative or journeyman to that of master or
even owner-entrepreneur meant mobility for a relatively short dis-
tance, and was encountered probably not infrequently. This degree
of mobility was sufficient to create the belief in the power and in
the possibilities of ascent; its importance was overstressed and its
prevalence exaggerated. It became and remains an important myth
of British entrepreneurial circles. A piece of social reality from the
days when industrial enterprises were scarcely larger than handi-
craft shops has lived on to become perhaps the most powerful
buttress of independent entrepreneurship in contemporary Britain.57
5. Recent Changes in Entrepreneurship in Britain
Bank credit played an increasingly important role in Britain as the
nineteenth century wore on, but it was chiefly used for working
capital. Most of the fixed capital in British industry was supplied
out of savings of private individuals and reinvested profits and earn-
ings of going enterprises. Perhaps the best summary of this situation
is provided by Sir John Clapham, who writes that the London money
market "was important mainly, as a furnisher and economiser of
circulating capital. ... Itwas of more immediate importance to the
merchant than to the manufacturer, because the circulating element
dominates commerce....Theprovincial banker gave every as-
sistance to men he trusted, allowing them ample overdrafts at all
times; but even he regarded plant, machinery 'or works of any
description' as ideally bad security for loans. Almost all the fixed
capital of manufacturing industry, as it existed in 1850, and the
overwhelmingly greater part of the additions and renewals made
during the next thirty-six years, came from what the economists of
the age called—wish more reason than their critics have sometimes
allowed—the abstinence of those steady manufacturers whom the
provincial bankers trusted."58
Here was a characteristic mode of supplying industry with capital
A book-length study on the role of the rags-to-riches story in the United
States, which shows how important was and is the belief in the possibilities of
social mobility upward over often large distances, will, I hope, soon be pub-
lished by my colleague and friend R. Richard Wohi. Its tentative titleis
Onward and Upward: American Ideologies of Success. -
Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, as cited, Vol. xi,pp.
855-856.
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for its fixed assets which differed profoundly from the pattern which
developed in France and other parts of the Continent.
These methods of supplying industrial fixed capital contributed
in Britain to the prevalence, even today, of small and medium-sized
plants in many industries which in the United States, and even
Germany, are normally considered to require large corporate organi-
zation. In part this explains why in many branches of engineering,
food-processing, construction, and other fields, British industry is
less productive than German or American industry. In part it also
appears to confirm Schumpeter's thesis that most conspicuous eco-
nomic progress is made not in those industries in which competition
by many small firms prevails, but in those in which large concerns
abound. If the problem is looked at from Schumpeter's viewpoint
that economic progress is served by what he calls "creative destruc-
tion" of capital, it is easy to see that in a small enterprise, in which
the-horizon of the owner is circumscribed by considerations of his
nearest of kin, destruction of capital, even if it be creative destruc-
tion, will be engaged in at best hesitatingly and gingerly.9 The
very smallness of enterprise militates against grand and, widespread
introduction of innovations in either technology or industrial or-
ganization.
Moreover, the very fact that Britain became an industrial country
earlier than her main competitors now imposes a serious disadvantage
on her. Her capital equipment is older and more obsolete as is
her form of industrial organization. Gerschenkron has reminded us
that for long France and Germany bore the burden of backwardness.
We can turn his observation around and find that Britain is weighed
down by the burden of too early industrialization.80 This situation
50 Joseph A. Schumpeter, CapitalLrm, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper,
1942, Chap. vu.
60 See Gerschenkron, op. cit., pp. 4-7. Thorstein Veblen saw and evaluated
clearly the "penalty" which England had to pay for "having been thrown into
the lead and so having shown the way." The entire fourth chapter of his
Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (new ed., Viking, 1939) is
devoted to this issue. Veblen stresses especially the fact that the earlier creation
of real capital in Britain burdened her with a technology which tended to
become outdated, but which was difficult to change, since this would require
a complete replacement of large chunks of technologically inefficient plant
by new plant: (E.g. the narrow-gauge railroads of Britain would have to be
replaced by broader-gauge railroads. This would require not merely the creation
of new, admittedly more efficient freight cars, but also the rebuilding of stations
and shunting and switching yards—in fact, of almost the entire existing plant.
This is clearly impossible.) Veblen also draws attention to the fact that "the
system which the English -.. workedOut into its farther consequences was the
system of handicraft and petty trade, and the frame of mind native or normal
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was not counteracted to any large extent by flexible adjustment to
newly arising demand patterns or to the competition of the newer
industrial nations. In design and general execution British products
remained, on the whole, conservative, though qualitatively superior.
As other countries became more and more formidable competitors
in industrial products, British entrepreneurs tried to take primarily
defensive measures. Control of the international financial markets,
gentlemen's agreements forming quasi cartels, the buttressing of the
bonds of Empire, and, finally, protective tariffs and exchange control
were the chief measures taken to provide some degree of security
and stability for British industry. These measures are symptomatic
of the loss of much of the earlier spirit of ebullient venturesomeness
and creative entrepreneurship.
But this change of heart was not confined to the small industrial
entrepreneur, whose base of operations remained strictly limited in
a world in which he had to compete with giant firms controlling vast
arrays of sales forces, modern research laboratories, and the most
up-to-date technological and organizational equipment. The spirit
of prudence, caution, and conservatism was catching. Combined with
Britain's political decline and the loss of many of her foreign markets
to younger and more vigorous competitors, it affected all layers of
British entrepreneurship. Although a portion of British industry re-
mained relatively small, it was only a portion, and, as was shown
earlier in this essay, the most spectacular advances in technology and
most decisive victories in creative entrepreneurship had been won in
the fields in which large-scale enterprises developed. In these fields,
however, the general adoption of the joint stock company form con-
tributed to the decline of venturesomeness.
The joint stock company became the vehicle for large-scale in-
dustrial organization soon after 1825. It experienced rapid extension
in the succeeding twenty-five years, chiefly because of its use in
the financing of railways. In the early stages of railway-building and
of factory industry, only minute amounts of capital were supplied
by banks. Just as in the earlier case of canal-building, a considerable
portion of the capital needed for the construction of early railways
was raised in the various localities which were connected by them.
Tooke waxes quite indignant when he discusses this terrible "passion
to this industrial system is that which stands for self-help and an equal chance"
(ibid., pp. 99-100). This is a highly abbreviated statement of a point which
is discussed at considerably greater length in the text.
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forRailway Gambling [which] had penetrated the upper and mid-
dle classes....Inevery street of every town persons were to be
found who were holders of Railway Shares."' Now it is true that
many people borrowed from the banks in order to raise capital
for the purchase of railroad shares, a practice which in Tooke's
view had such nefarious aspects. But the important thing is that
banking capital for railway construction became available only
indirectly; that is, not the banks, but private individuals, undertook
to gamble. Here is another instance which shows how the early nine-
teenth century stock company represented a means by which the
by now institutionalized roles of risk-taking could be exercised.
Joint stock company ownership made possible consolidation of
railroads, and, with the general applicability of limited liabifity for
all registered stock companies, these large organizations became by
the turn of the century administrators of funds which were supplied
to them by persons filled not with the "passion for Railway Gam-
bling" or, for that matter, any other kind of gambling, but progres-
sively more with a rentier outlook.62 Thus by the beginning of the
twentieth century, the evolution of entrepreneurship in Britain had
come full circle. From small beginnings the British middle classes
rose to become one of the chief factors contributing to making Britain
the leading industrial nation in the world for some 200 years and at
the same time the most important political power in Europe. With
the decline of Britain's economic and political leadership came the
decline in the enterprising spirit of her business leaders. The tradi-
tions of individualism and radicalism in the British middle classes
were not strong enough to overcome the forces which, in the new
61ThomasTooke and Henry Newmarch, A Hi.story of Prices, London, Long-
man, Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1857, Vol. v, p. 234. On the financing
of the earlier British railways see Leland H. Jenks, The Migration of British
Capital o 1875, Knopf, 1027, pp. 130 if.
62Unfortunately,there is little evidence available in printed sources on the
prevalence of this attitude in present-day Britain. Most of the liberal econo-
mists who opposed the "socialism" of the Labor government were chiefly con-
cerned with the evils of planning and did not discuss the shortcomings of
entrepreneurs, or, if they did, they attributed the loss of entrepreneurial spirit
to the increased vexations placed upon businessmen by the various forms of
government regulation and interference. One factor strengthening the rentier
outlook of British entrepreneurs, and of the British public in general, has been
mentioned by Jenks. He suggests that the growth of British foreign investment
in the third quarter of the nineteenth century had two concomitant effects.
First, the paramount place in the investment market was secured by banks, and,
second, this "fostered the growth of a rentier governing class, whose economic
interests lay outside the community in which they lived and exerted in-
fluence." Op.cit.,p. 334.
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environment, tended to exert a paralyzing influence on the old spirit
of speculativeness and venturesomeness. The small man found safety
in withdrawing into a hard shell of a narrow market, using time-
tested procedures and technologies and serving a range of known and
faithful customers. The large firms appeared to conform to that
law of capitalistic development which Sombart stated when he said
that in the age of corporate enterprise "even a rationalization of
entrepreneurship has taken place, so to speak. We can pursue this
change in detail. We see how the importance of specific entre-
preneurial activity, or intuition, of a 'sixth sense' diminishes. The
number of knowable, predictable circumstances increases and the
inclination of business leaders grows to base their enterprises on a
foundation of knowledge. Enterprises thus attain the character of
administrations, their leaders the character of bureaucrats, and the
gigantic size of the apparatus contributes to this development."63
Sombart might have added that the people holding the stock of these
enterprises progressively acquire the character of rentiers.
6. Summary
In this paper an attempt has been made to provide a partial ex-
planation of the differences in the timing and rate of growth of the
French and British economies since the coming to power of a capi-
talist social order in the two countries. The chief variables which
were selected for study were the forms of entrepreneurship and the
source and magnitude of capital supplied for fixed investment in
secondary production. While the two variables are correlated with
one another, they may be discussed separately. Industrial entre-
preneurs may come from families which already hold positions of
economic power, or they may originate in the lower social strata and
succeed in moving upward to positions of business leadership. Capi-
tal may be supplied by the state, by persons holding accumulated
wealth, or by the rising entrepreneurs who may come into possession
of some small initial sum through luck, accident, or hard work, but
who continue to increase the capital at their disposal through ab-
stinence and "inner-worldly asceticism."
In France the chief characteristic of industrial growth under the
ancien régime was the predominance of government as initiator of
a large portion of industrial expansion and as supplier of capital for
industry. Industrial entrepreneurs, as such, played a secondary iole.
68Italicsadded. Sombart, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
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Theirprestige and political power were subordinated to those of
officials and large financiers, a pattern which remained characteristic
of later French economic development. Reinvestment of profits,
although not uncommon, never took on great significance because
businesses were run on a family basis and the status and consumption
needs of the family members competed with the needs of the busi-
ness for new capital. Moreover, since industry developed under an
umbrella of state regulation and protection, many industrial entre-
preneurs tended to be overly cautious when the economy had grown
to be too large for the state to take all industry under its tutelage.
Hence, expansion was often kept back, new investment delayed, and
a policy of risk-taking avoided. A recent indication of this attitude
toward investment is provided in a book by Jacques Lacour-Gayet
which appeared in the spring of 1958. Although it is devoted chiefly
to a restatement of the principles of classical nineteenth century
liberalism, Lacour-Gayet discusses in one chapter what French in-
dustry must do to become •as successful as American industry. His
main emphasis is on the expansion of sales and on technical and
organizational improvement of the distributive apparatus. Only very
scanty attention is given to the cheapening of production and the
general improvement of company management." The efficiency of
the American self-service supermarket could not be overlooked, but
the less obvious complements of American industrial success re-
mained closed to this Frenchman, in spite of his penetrating mind
and his attempt to see the American picture as a whole. Similarly,
the accounts published of that French "maverick" entrepreneur
Marcel Boussac stress his emphasis on expansion of sales. But at
the same time they relate that the organization of his cotton "empire"
is as centralized as that of any other French firm, his heirs apparent
in the business are his son-in-law and his brother, he makes all
important decisions himself, and the magnitude and structure of
the managerial staff of his enterprises are quite unlike those of any
American counterpart.°5
The point I wish to stress is not that an aggressive sales policy
is unimportant, but that it is a result rather than a cause of develop-
ment. Sales are necessary because mass production of cheap articles
has been made possible through investment. The force pushing an
economy forward is not the attempt to expand sales; it is the willing-
64SeeNouveaux propos d'un liberal, Paris,S.P.I.D.,1958, esp. pp. 95ff.
65SeeJohn McDonald, "Marcel Boussac: Tycoon," Fortune, September 1952,
pp. 107-109 and 198-206.
335HOSELITZ
ness to risk the investment of fixed capital with the expectation, per-
haps even the gamble, of conquerMg a market. What Lacour-Gayet
preaches and what Boussac practices is an imitation not of American
methods and practice, but of the methods and practice of the mer-
chant adventurers of 400 years ago.
The crucial difference between French and British entrepreneur-
ship is the attitude toward investment of risk-bearing fixed capital.
In France the bulk of this capital was supplied first by the state and
later by the investment banks. The state could and did minimize the
risks by concentrating on the subsidization of those industries whose
products enjoyed a well-defined effective demand, and by recoup-
ing losses from general tax revenue. The investment bank minimized
risk either by spreading its investments over different industrial
branches, so that losses in one would be counterbalanced by gains
in another, or, if it chose to concentrate its investments in one in-
dustry alone—as tended to be the case in pre-Worid War I Germany—
by attempting to acquire a monopoly position and to minimize risks
by the monopolistic exploitation of consumers.
It is not surprising that the theory of "finance capitalism" which
seemed to fit conditions of post-1871 Germany and France so well
had only a very uneasy applicability to Britain and the United States.
In fact, one of the criticisms leveled against Hilferding's book on the
subject°° is that he draws his examples exclusively from Continental
experience and omits almost completely any reference to the "clas-
sical country of capitalism," Great Britain.
The reason for this inapplicability of an important portion of
Hilferding's thesis to British conditions lies in the different nature
of entrepreneurship and capital mobilization in that country. In
Britain capital was supplied by individual merchants, industrialists,
and, after the generalization of the joint stock company, the public
at large. Investment in risk-bearing industrial fixed capital became
a socially accepted function which could be exercised by anyone
who had liquid funds or access to them through borrowing. In
the classical period of British industrial development, from about
1775 to that triumphant symbol of British preeminence, the Great
Exhibition of 1851, this was the characteristic pattern of industrial
investment. That the joint stock company later came to push the
individual industrial entrepreneur and even the partnership into the
66RudolfHilferding, Da8Finanzkapital,Wien, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung,
1923, esp. Chaps. 'Vandv.
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backgroundis not surprising, for it could muster amounts of such
magnitude as fully to overwhelm the small men.
But the patterns of social action developed in the Industrial Rev-
olution in Great Britain had two important, lasting consequences.
The social order was shaken up and movement upward became not
only possible, but even a matter of quite common occurrence. This
possibility of rising in the social scale became surrounded with an
almost legendary aura; the belief in its importance has contribited
in no small measure to the existence of greater economic opportuni-
ties in Britain for the common man even today. Second, the impetus
imparted to British entrepreneurship in its most vigorous period re-
sulted in a rapid advance of national output and productivity, so
that at the present Britishers, in spite of setbacks and a gradual
stagnation of the rate of economic progress, have a higher average
real income than Frenchmen or other peoples on the European
continent. However high or low one may estimate social equality
and a more elevated level of material living standards, the "heroic"
period of British economic development made these things possible.
In the last analysis they belong to the characteristics which form
the distinguishing marks of a nation.
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